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Abstract
This paper studies the mechanism of financial intermediaries’ information produc-
tion and its impact on industry-level growth, especially its difference between industries
that differ in the technological composition of small firms. We build a growth model
in which (i) both loan contracts and production of information on borrowing firms’
productivities are endogenously determined, and (ii) the smaller firm’s productivity is
more costly to assess. Analytic results show that the smaller firm’s innately greater
degree of informational opaqueness hinders its growth, especially in the early stage
of a country’s financial development. We provide some evidence supporting the key
mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Financial systems can greatly affect the allocative efficiency and hence economic development
(King and Levine; 1993; Buera et al.; 2011). However, less is known about the mechanism
of financial intermediaries’ information production and its implications for the cross-section
of capital allocation and economic growth (Greenwood and Jovanovic; 1990; Giannetti and
Yu; 2014). This paper examines the mechanism of the effect of the financial intermediaries’
improved efficiency on firm-level growth via increased information production, especially its
disproportionate growth impact on the industry that has a greater share of small firms (small
industry), and provides some evidence (Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine; 2008;
Beck, Demirguc-kunt and Maksimovic; 2008).1 The key contribution of this paper to the
literature is that we develop and integrate the theory of financial intermediaries’ information
production more tightly with extant empirical findings about financial development and firm
growth as well as with new finding documented in this paper. Our model is featured that
both information production in the financial sector and production of goods and services in
the real sector are fully flexible, which enables us to clarify the conditions under which the
model’s predictions about the relative firm growth between the small and large industries
are consistent with extant and new empirical findings.
We are motivated by the fact that the financial-intermediation cost is negatively corre-
lated with the borrowing firm’s size—more costly to assess creditworthiness of a small firm
than that of a large firm—(Petersen and Rajan; 2002). This indicates that technological
1As discussed in Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine (2008), we need to identify “technologically”
small industry, i.e., the industry of which average firm size is small due to technological factors. The
reason is that in reality, many non-technological factors (i.e., all sorts of frictions relevant to the capital
market) are likely to affect the industry’s average firm size. It is challenging to identify the growth effect
on the industry’s average firm size. To avoid reverse causality, Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine
(2008) used the U.S. industry’s share as a proxy of all fundamental factors that determine the industry’s
“technological” composition of small firms.
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determinants of the firm size are highly correlated with the firm’s informational opaqueness.
We study how such a heterogeneity component of the cost of financial intermediation affects
the sensitivity of a small industry’s growth to financial development. In our model, capital
allocation is efficient for firms of which productivities the financier succeeds to learn, which
is straightforward given that there is no informational friction for these firms. By contrast,
for firms of which productivities are unknown to the financier, capital allocation is distorted
in the classical sense: the small firm’s MPK is higher than the large firm’s MPK, which
is driven by the informational friction. In the case in which the financial intermediary’s
marginal cost curve of information production is steeper for the smaller firm, the greater the
industry’s composition of small firms, the harder the financier learns the firm’s productivity,
the more the industry benefits from the financial intermediaries’ improved efficiency (e.g.,
adoption of new information technologies).
We develop a parsimonious growth model in which both the real sector’s production
of goods/services and the financial sector’s information production are fully flexible (e.g.,
continuous and concave in inputs) and endogenously determined. We consider the economy
in which (domestic) firms transform capital into the single final good by using the decreasing-
returns-to-scale technology. The firm-level (realized) productivity is stochastic (i.i.d. over
time) and, importantly, a private information known to the firm itself but not to others
(Arellano et al.; 2012). Firms belong to one of two industries— “Small” vs. “Large”— that
differ in the (publicly known) distribution of firms’ productivities, which would determine
the technological firm-size distribution if there were no distortions. 2
In the model, firms finance investment via one-period loan contracts in every period.3
2Productivity is one, even though not all, of determinants of the industry’s technological firm-size distri-
bution. For analytical tractability, we consider this one factor model. Otherwise, the model would become
too complicated to answer the main research question addressed in this paper.
3Long-term loan contracts are ruled out for the purpose of tractability. Our goal is to build a simple
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There is a representative financier that is the most efficient in production of information on
productivities of domestic borrowing firms. As such, we assume that the financier engages
in, prior to designing loan contracts, costly production of information on borrowing firms’
productivities and providing the intermediation service on behalf of (international) lenders.4
In doing so, the financier reduces the conflict of interests between borrowers and lenders.
The financier can raise any amount of capital at the risk-free rate in the international capital
market, due to the assumed commitment to repayment. That is, sovereign default is not
a key friction studied in this paper. The main source of distortions is the informational
friction (i.e., borrowers’ private information) but not the country-level “capital endowment”
constraint (Giannetti and Yu; 2014). The financier assesses the borrowing firm’s produc-
tivity, which is, in reality, likely strongly related to the firm’s creditworthiness, and then
optimally designs loan contracts by taking into consideration the borrowing firm’s expected
productivity, incentive compatibility and participation constraints. Importantly, the smaller
firm’s productivity is more difficult for the financier to assess.5 Using the truth-revealling
mechanism, we solve for equilibrium: the level of information production, and the terms of
loan contracts. Prior to information production, the financier is lack of information on the
borrower’s productivity. Thus, the level of information production is the same for all firms
belonging to a given industry, i.e., within-industry pooling, but differs across industries. By
information production, the lender is enable to separate the different types of firms by offer-
ing larger capital to higher types and making them pay for the privilege (by increasing their
debt repayment). 6 The financier’s information production is in equilibrium determined by
model so that we can confront the model’s predictions about firm-level capital growth with data.
4Ultimately, lenders can be either international or domestic. For the purpose of simplicity, we consider
the case of the international lender, because both are identical in the model.
5For a given borrowing firm, the information-production cost is stochastic and not observed by the
financier so that it can not signal the borrowing firm’s productivity prior to designing the loan contracts.
6For a given industry, loan and capital allocation is in equilibrium monotonic to the borrowing firms’
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the trade-off between the industry-level expected benefit and cost of information production,
which then determines the variation in capital growth across industries.
Consider the two industries that differ in the technological composition of small firms,
labelled small and large industry, respectively: the large industry’s productivity distribution
first-order stochastically dominates the small industry’s. On the one hand, the small industry
is prone to the asymmetric information problem to the greater extent and hence has the
advantage in terms of the greater marginal benefit of information production—the greater
growth potential that would have been realized if the current financial constraint had been
relaxed. On the other hand, the small industry also has the disadvantage: the financier’s
greater marginal cost—more costly to assess the smaller firm’s productivity—i.e., the steeper
marginal-cost curve. These two opposing forces determine the relative level of information
production, and hence capital growth, between the small and large industries.
Main analytic results are as follows: Consider two countries that differ in the financier’s
efficiency of assessing borrowers’ productivities, where the financier’s efficiency is the model-
side measure of a country’s financial development. Under certain condition, the model pre-
dicts that in the more financially developed country, the disproportionate impact of growth
in the financier’s information-production efficiency on the small industry’s capital growth is
of magnitude greater than in the less financially developed country. The economic mecha-
nism is as follows: Consider the financier’s marginal cost curve of information production,
especially its difference between the small and large industries. In a financially advanced
country, such a cost difference between these two industries is negligible. By contrast, in a
financially underdeveloped country, it is substantial: the financier’s marginal cost curve is
substantially steeper for the small industry than for the large industry. Note that the steeper
productivities although the level of information production is the same across these firms.
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the marginal cost curve, the smaller the benefit from improvement in information produc-
tion. This implies that in a financially underdeveloped country, the disproportionate effect
of the financier’s improved efficiency on the small industry’s capital growth is of magnitude
smaller than in a financially advanced country.
We empirically examine main results of the model. First, we provide evidence supporting
a hypothesis that (i) the cost of financial intermediation is disproportionately greater for the
small industry than for the large industry and (ii) the spread in such a cost for the small
industry (relative to that for the large industry) is decreasing in the degree of a country’s
financial market development. We use a sample of 8,366 syndicated loans during the period
from January 1, 1987 to December 31, 2014, provided by Reuter/Loan Pricing Corporation’s
DealScan database. This database provides detailed information on loan tranche-level char-
acteristics (including its size, spread, upfront fee, maturity, signing date, etc.) and has been
employed in many empirical syndicated loan studies.7 The cost of financial intermediation is
measured as the cost for lenders to certify a borrower’s creditworthiness, for which we con-
sider many different proxies such as commitment fee, letter of credit fee, annual fee, and loan
spread. As in Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine (2008), we consider the industry’s
technological composition of small firms that is not constrained by the financial obstacles
and measured as the corresponding U.S. industry’s small firm share in employment.8 The
results indicate that the cost spread of financial intermediaries between the small and large
industries is decreasing in the level of a country’s financial market development.
Second, we test the main results of the model that the effect of improvements in the
financial intermediary’s capability of information production disproportionately benefits the
7Syndicated loans are especially promising as an empirical laboratory for studying information asymmetry:
Sufi (2007), Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) and Gatti et al. (2013).
8Plehn-Dujowich (2009) also takes the share in employment of small firms empirically as agents’ hidden
types.
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small industry’s firm growth, especially to magnitude greater in the more financial developed
country. To measure the industry-level firm growth, we use the United Nations Industrial
Statistics database, which provides industry-level aggregated information on performance of
all firms. Our sample covers firms in the 20 NACE two-digit manufacturing industries and
in 28 countries over the world, during the period 2004-2012 annually. We take the annual
growth rate of a given country’s credit bureau index during the sample period, as for the
proxy of growth in the capability of information production of the given country’s financial
intermediaries. The credit bureau index measures, for a given country, the percentage of
individuals and companies of which past repayment history is provided, labelled credit bu-
reau coverage rate. Borrowers’ repayment history is likely to provide valuable information
on the likelihood of the comparable borrower’s future repayment, and hence to reduce the
overall cost of production of information on borrowers’ creditworthiness (Djankov et al.;
2007; Arellano et al.; 2012). Here, we assume that the borrowing firm’s creditworthiness
(the data counterpart) is closely related to the firm’s profitability/productivity (the model
counterpart). To solve the endogeneity problem between growth and finance, our empirical
strategy captures the differential effect of financial innovation on firm growth among indus-
tries that differ in their ”technological” firm size (supposed to be independent of a country’s
aggregate economic development/growth), which is believed to relieve the concern about
the reverse causality. At the same time, another endogeneity concern due to the omitted
variables problem is also dealt with controlling for many plausible explanatory variables as
in Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine (2008) and other influential papers. We use the
dynamic system GMM estimation method (Blundell and Bond (1998)) to reduce the concern
about the biases associated with cross-sectional regressions by taking the country specific
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fixed effect into account.9 Our regression results show that growth in the provision of in-
formation on borrowers’ creditworthiness is associated with disproportionate firm growth in
the small industry, especially to the greater extent in a more financially developed country.
Taken together, our empirical findings suggest evidence supporting the model’s results that
the smaller firm’s innately greater degree of informational opaqueness hinders its growth,
especially in the early stage of a country’s financial development.
This paper contributes to the literature that studies financial intermediaries’ information
production (Leland and Pyle; 1977; Campbell and Kracaw; 1980; Boyd and Prescott; 1986;
Chemmanur and Fulghieri; 1994; Fulghieri and Lukin; 2001; Stein; 2002; Araujo and Minetti;
2007; Giannetti and Yu; 2014) and, more broadly, the evolution of both technological and
financial innovations (Greenwood et al.; 2010; Laeven et al.; 2015). While these aforemen-
tioned papers focus mainly on the demand-side determinants of financial intermediation, we
emphasise the trade-off between the demand- and supply-side determinants.10
This paper is also related to the literature that studies financial development and eco-
nomic development. Many papers have studied consequences of improved financial inter-
mediation by leaving the mechanism of financial intermediation itself as a black box (Buera
et al.; 2011), while this paper focuses on studying the mechanism of financial intermediation.
The empirical analysis of this paper is closely related to Beck et al. (2005), Beck,
Demirguc-kunt and Maksimovic (2008), Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine (2008)
and Beck et al. (2012); these papers document the effect of the cross-country difference in fi-
nancial development on relative firm growth between small- and large-sized firms/industries,
9Panel dataset can control for omitted variables without actually observing them. For example, our
panel data set lets us control for unobserved variables such as difference in social norm determines economic
growth, but do not change over time.
10One exception is Giannetti and Yu (2014) who study how the cost of financial intermediaries’ information
production determines the formal vs. relationship-based financing depending on the country’s development
stages in terms of the size of financial intermediaries’ capital endowment.
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which this paper complements both empirically and theoretically. In particular, we iden-
tify the effect of within-country growth in the financial intermediaries’ efficiency on relative
firm growth between small- and large-sized industries. King and Levine (1993), Levine
et al. (2000) and Aghion et al. (2005) document that aggregate measures of development in
credit/financial markets are significantly associated with per-capita GDP across countries,
which this paper examines by using more disaggregated industry-level data.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the model, and Section
3 discusses its analytic results. Section 4 discusses empirical evidence. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
This section develops a growth model in which (i) both information production in the finan-
cial sector and production of goods in the real sector are fully flexible, and (ii) a financial
intermediary’s production of information on a borrowing firm’s profitability (which is likely,
in reality, to be highly related to the borrowing firm’s creditworthiness) is a key to deter-
mining firm-level capital growth and the allocative efficiency of capital. More specifically,
the model is a small open economy with access to the international capital market and has
features as follows: domestic firms need to raise external funds and have private information
on their own productivities, where such private information is a key source of distortions
in the capital allocation in this economy. A representative financier, which can commit its
repayment and hence is able to borrow any amount of capital at a low cost (i.e., at the
risk-free rate) in the international capital market, intermediates the international lenders
and domestic borrowers/firms. The financier produces information on a borrowing firm’s
11For discussion of the feedback effect between financial and economic development, see, e.g., Greenwood
and Jovanovic (1990) and Fuente and Marin (1996).
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productivity, which mitigates the allocative inefficiency but is costly. Importantly, produc-
tion of information on productivity of a small firm is more costly than that of a large firm is.
The trade-off between benefit and cost of the financier’s information production determines
the degree of distortions in the capital allocation, especially relative firm growth between
the two industries that differ in their technological composition of small firms.
2.1 Environment
We consider a small open economy with access to the international capital market in which
a risk-free asset of the (real) return rf ≥ 0 is traded.
Technology There is a continuum of (domestic) firms indexed by i. Firm i can operate the
decreasing-return-to-scale technology producing the single final good yt(i). The production
function of firm i is written as:
yt(i) = [zt(i)]
1−α[kt(i)]
α, α ∈ (0, 1) (1)
where zt(i) > 0 refers to firm i’s (exogenous) idiosyncratic productivity, kt(i) ≥ 0 capital
used in production by firm i, and α the returns to scale.
Firm i owns no capital and its outside-option value is normalized to zero (Giannetti and
Yu; 2014). Thus, firm i finances, at the beginning of a period t, capital kt(i) via the one-
period loan contract provided by the financier. For simplicity, we assume that capital, if
used in production, depreciates fully at the end of each period.12
Idiosyncratic productivity shocks zt(i) ∈ [z, z] are drawn from the distribution F (·) in-
12The assumption of 100 percent depreciation of capital does not hurt the generality of our analytic results
and helps to simplify the notation.
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dependently across individual firms i where 0 < z < z and F (·) is constant over time. For
analytic tractability, we assume that idiosyncratic productivity shocks zt(i) are independent
over time.13
Firms are grouped by the (ex-ante publicly known) distribution of idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks. There are two groups of firms, and these two groups differ in their cumulative
distribution functions F (z; j) defined over z ∈ [z, z], which is indexed by j ∈ {S, L}; group
j = S stands for the technologically small-sized industry, and group j = L the technologically
large-sized industry, where an industry’s technological size refers to how large the industry’s
average firm size would be if there were no distortions. For each of two groups/industries,
there is a continuum of firms of measure one. In this paper, ‘group of firms’ and ‘industry’ will
be used interchangeably. It is public information whether firm i belongs to group/industry
j = S or j = L , which is thus incorporated into the terms of borrowing in the credit market.
And the firm i’s realised idiosyncratic productivity shock z(i) is private information known
to only firm i itself, indicating that the asymmetric information problem is inherent.
More specifically, each distribution F (·; j) has finite mean and standard deviation, and
its probability density function is denoted by f(·; j). Let Fj ≡ F (·; j) denote the distribution
j ∈ {S, L}. Without loss of generality, we assume that the average productivity is higher in
industry j = L than in industry j = S: E[z|FL] > E[z|FS], essentially so that in industry
j = L, the average technological firm size is larger than in industry j = S.
For a technical reason related to the optimal design of loan contracts, we also assume
13The main reason for the assumed i.i.d. process of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks zt(i) is to keep
the model tractable so that we can obtain analytic results of the equilibrium outcome. An alternative case
of zt(i) being serially correlated would raise the issue of dynamic contracting, which would greatly sacrifice
the model’s tractability without gaining much insight for the research question addressed in this paper. The
key in our model is the component of a borrowing firm’s productivity that is unpredictable in the absence
of information production in financial markets. Thus, idiosyncratic productivity shocks zt(i) in our model
are intended to capture the component of a borrowing firm’s profitability that can not be assessed correctly
by using only publicly available information.
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that each distribution F (·; j) has a log-concave density as in the mechanism design literature
(Bagnoli and Bergstrom; 1997).14 Let φ(z; j) denote the inverse of the hazard rate:
φ(z; j) ≡ 1− F (z; j)
f(z; j)
. (2)
We assume that the inverse hazard rate φ(z; j) satisfies two properties as follows:
Assumption (A1) : φ′(z; j) ≤ 0,∀z ∈ [z, z], and φ(z; j) < z
1− α
,∀j ∈ {S, L}.
The first part of the assumption (A1) says that for both two distributions FS and FL, the
inverse hazard rate φ(z; j) is non-increasing in z, which essentially guarantees that for a given
group j, the capital allocation is in equilibrium non-decreasing in the firm’s productivity z
(as commonly assumed in the literature). The second part of the assumption (A1) essentially
states that for both two distributions FS and FL, the inverse hazard rate φ(z; j) is bounded
above by z/[1 − α] so that it is profitable for the financial intermediary to serve every firm
in need of external finance.
Market Structure and Tradability of Final Good The market of the final good is
perfectly competitive. Without loss of generality, we assume that in every period, the price
of the final good is normalised to one. The final good, which can be consumed by domestic
household, is tradable with no delivery costs (i.e., zero iceberg cost): one unit of the final
good can be converted into one unit of capital and delivered to international lenders.
14Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1997) discuss merits of the log-concave density with numerous examples includ-
ing the uniform, normal, exponential, logistic, Beta, and Gamma distributions.
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Private Information and Financial Intermediation Firm i observes its own ex-post
realised idiosyncratic productivity shock zt(i), while others do not. As a result, the alloca-
tion of capital via the capital market might be inefficient due to the asymmetric information
problem between lenders and borrowers, calling for information production so as to alleviate
such a problem. The domestic financial intermediary, labelled financier, which is the best
capable of acquiring and processing information on the domestic industrial firms’ productiv-
ities zt(i), does the job of intermediating borrowers/firms and lenders so that the conflict of
interests between them is reduced. The financier can commit to repayment without default
risk so that the financier can raise capital at a low cost (i.e., at the risk-free rate) in the
international capital market and provide all (domestic) firms with as much amount of capital
as demanded. Thus, we abstract from the issue of sovereign default (related to the issue of
the limited total amount of capital), as we focus on the informational friction that distorts
the capital allocation. Each firm faces the terms of borrowing that depends, of course, on the
level of borrowing (i.e., the larger the loan amount, the higher the cost of borrowing). Last,
we assume that long-term international borrowing is not available (due to some frictions in
the international capital market).
The financier is the monopolist in the domestic market of intermediation services. It
turns out that in this setting, the financier behaves in equilibrium as if the social planner that
maximizes the small open economy’s output subject to the same informational constraint.
Note that the financier itself has no default risk. Thus, this economy suffers only from
the informational friction but not from the limited total amount of capital that can be
raised. This feature of our model enables us to clarify the mechanism that determines the
financial intermediaries’ equilibrium production of information on borrowers’ productivi-
ties/profitabilities, which would mitigate the informational friction and hence improve the
12
allocative efficiency. By contrast, Giannetti and Yu (2014) study the setup in which the to-
tal amount of capital available to financial intermediaries is limited and hence a key factor,
beyond the informational friction, in determining formal vs. relationship-based financing.15
Timing At the beginning of a period t, idiosyncratic productivity shocks zt(i) are realized;
the financier learns zt(i) stochastically by paying the stochastic information-production costs
that are realised but not observed by the financier; the financier borrows the aggregate level
of capital from the international lenders, designs a menu of loan contracts and provides firms
with capital. At the end of a period t, production and consumption of the final good takes
place; firms pay back to the financier, who then pays the international lender(s) capital plus
interests. Figure 1 illustrates graphically the timing of events.
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15Thus, the mechanism explored in our setup is related to, but different from, the mechanism in Giannetti
and Yu (2014) regarding determinants of efficiency-enhancing formal financing.
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Information Production Cost Consider borrowing firm i that belongs to group j. The
financier can learn firm i’s productivity zt(i; j) with probability µt(i; j) ∈ [0, 1] by paying the
information-production cost. If the financier fails to learn zt(i; j), then the financier simply
uses the group j’s distribution F (·; j) in designing the loan contract for firm i; in such a
case, the financier would optimally design the loan contract such that in equilibrium, firm i
is willing to voluntarily reveal zt(i; j) due to the “informational rent” paid by the financier.
Consider group j of firms. The financier’s information production takes place simul-
taneously across such firms. Note that prior to information production, the financier can
not distinguish individual borrowing firms who differ only in productivities, which are un-
known to the financier. Thus, the financier chooses the same level of information production
µt(i; j) = µt(j) across firms i that belong to the same group j, i.e., within-group pooling.
For group j, the financier chooses µt(j), the probability of success in learning produc-
tivities of group j’s firms (i.e., the measure of information production), subject to the cost
function of information production c(µt(j); zt(i; j), at) that is increasing and convex in µt(j).
More specifically, the cost function c(µt(j); zt(i; j), at) is stochastic and negatively correlated
with the borrowing/assessed firm i’s productivity zt(i; j) and written as:










, ∀µt(j) ∈ [0, 1], γ > 0 (3)
where c > 0 refers to the scale parameter for the information-production cost component
that is linear in µt(j) relative to the (normalized) quadratic component of the cost [µt(j)]
2/2,
and at > 0 is the financier’s efficiency of information production such that an increase in at
shifts down the information-production cost curves for borrowing firms in all industries.16
16There is ample evidence about the improvement of the efficiency in the financial sector. The financial
sector in the U.S. has grown steadily over the post-war period. In particular, the financial sector has
benefited greatly from innovation in computers and information technologies. For instance, from the early
14
Thus, at is interpreted as the level of this economy’s financial development.
Loan Contracts Let kt(zt(i)) denote capital supplied to firm i at the beginning of a period
t and dt(zt(i)) the firm i’s repayment at the end of the period t. The financier offers, at the
beginning of t, firm i the loan contract (kt(zt(i)), dt(zt(i))) depending on whether or not
the financier has learned zt(i). Given the choice of information production µt for group j of
firms, the financier succeeds in learning zt(i) for µt fraction of these firms and fails for (1−µt)
fraction (due to the law of large numbers). For a given group j, suppressing group index
j, we let (kNt (zt(i)), d
N
t (zt(i))) denote the loan contract for firm i conditional on that the




t (zt(i))) does the same conditional
on that the financier has failed to learn zt(i); similarly, let y
N
t (zt(i)) ≡ [zt(i)]1−α[kNt (zt(i))]α
and yOt (zt(i)) ≡ [zt(i)]1−α[kOt (zt(i))]α denote firm i’s end-of-period output conditional on
whether the financier has learned zt(i) or not, respectively.
Discussion: Model Specification We discuss implications of the model specifications,
especially the information-production cost function specified above. We consider group j of
firms in what follows and suppress the group index j unless otherwise mentioned. Consider
the cost component c · zt(i)−γ · µt that is linear in µt: it is negatively correlated with the
borrower’s productivity zt(i) given γ > 0. That is, for a given level of information produced
µt, production of information on a low-productivity firm is more costly than that on a high-
productivity firm is.17 This assumption essentially captures the fact that information on a
1980s onward, the value added per employee has increased much faster in the financial sector than in the
rest of the U.S. economy, see, e.g., Philippon and Reshef (2007).
17The cost of production of information on an individual borrower is not observed by the financier until
the loan contract is designed, and hence can not be used as the signal of the borrower’s productivity in
designing the loan contract.
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small firm is “soft” and difficult to obtain and assess (Petersen and Rajan; 2002).18 This fea-
ture of the information-production cost is intended to capture the supply-side determinants
of financial intermediation. There is ample evidence supporting that the spread of credit
availability or credit costs (proxied by the lending rate or required collateral) are negatively
correlated with a borrowing firm’s productivity and loan size (Cressy and Toivanen; 2001;
Hanley and Girma; 2006).19 The perfect correlation between the borrower’s productivity
zt(i) and the information-production cost is assumed for simplicity and does not hurt the
generality of the main results given the fact that we focus on the industry-level equilibrium
outcome (i.e., the law of large numbers).
We discuss how we model the industry’s technological firm-size distribution. Note that as
discussed above, the financier’s cost function of information production is negatively corre-
lated with the technological firm size, which is a critical component of our main hypothesis.
In this paper, the industry’s productivity distribution is used as a proxy of all fundamental
factors that determine the industry’s “technological” composition of small firms. Productiv-
ity is one, even though not all, of determinants of the industry’s technological firm-size distri-
bution. We consider this one-factor model mainly to keep the model analytically tractable.
Alternatively, we could consider multiple-factor model, which would then become too com-
plicated to answer the main research question addressed in this paper.
18This assumption can be also thought of as a reduced-form approach to the fact that relative to an
entrant, an incumbent surviving firm tends to have higher productivity, e.g., the selection effect, and also
has a greater advantage in access to external funds, e.g., reputation effect. More generally, we could model
the case of a positive serial correlation for a firm’s productivity process and derive endogenously the property
of information-production cost function being decreasing in the borrowing firm’s productivity, which would,
as discussed earlier, sacrifice the model’s tractability without gaining much insight.
19In addition, it seems also plausible that the magnitude of the heterogeneity component of information-
production cost is decreasing in the financial sector’s efficiency; for instance, Liberti and Mian (2010) estimate
the collateral spread of financing across riskiness and show that it is decreasing in the level of financial market
development.
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Domestic Household Consumption, Ownership, and Resource Constraint We
assume that the representative domestic household is the owner of all the domestic firms
and the financier. Note that we abstract from labour input in production, implying that the
domestic household income equals the profits earned and paid by the firms and financier.
Given the simplifying assumption that capital is supplied by international lenders, all of the
domestic household income is used to consumption (i.e., no domestic investment). Given
no aggregate uncertainty (i.e., no business cycle fluctuations), we assume that international
borrowing/saving is not used by domestic household (where long-term international borrow-
ing is already ruled out). That is, in this economy, consumption equals income, which is, as
mentioned above, profits of domestic firms and financier.
Let c̃t denote domestic household consumption at the end of period t. Let u(c̃) denote
the per-period utility function of domestic household, which satisfies the usual Inada con-
ditions.20 We skip to discuss the domestic household problem, as it has no implications for
our main issue of relative firm growth between the two industries.





yt(z; j)dF (z; j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate output






kt(z; j) + c(µt(j); z, j, at)
]
dF (z; j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregae level of international borrowing
(4)





yt(z; j)dF (z; j) is used either to domestic consumption c̃t





[kt(z; j) + c(µt(j); z, j, at)]dF (z; j).
Here, the repayment to international lenders consists of the two components. First, given a
depreciation rate of capital δ ∈ (0, 1], the financier’s repayment (to international lenders) for
capital used in production is written as:
∑
j∈{S,L}[δ + rf ]
∫ z
z
kt(z; j)dF (z; j). In our model,
20That is, we assume that: u′(·) > 0, limc̃→0 u′(c̃) =∞, and limc̃→∞ u′(c̃) = 0.
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δ equals one: δ = 1 (i.e., full depreciation), as discussed earlier. Second, the financier




c(µt(j); z, j, at)dF (z; j), which is, together with interest, paid to international
lenders at the end of period.
In short, output yt(z; j), which is produced by a domestic firm with productivity z in
industry j, is paid either to the financier dt(z; j) or to the firm’s owner (i.e., domestic
household). Meanwhile, the financier’s profit, i.e., dt(z; j) net the repayment to inter-
national lenders for capital [1 + rf ]kt(z; j) and for funds used to information production
[1 + rf ]c(µt(j); z, j, at), is also paid to domestic household who is the financier’s owner.
As such, domestic household income, which also equals domestic household consumption





yt(z; j)dF (z; j)−
∑




kt(z; j) + c(µt(j); z, j, at)
]
dF (z; j).
The Financier’s Problem Consider group j of firms. Given the choice of information
production µt(j) for group j, which is analysed soon, the financier designs optimal loan
contracts to maximise its own end-of-period profit from intermediation services V (µt(j); j):










[dOt (z; j)− (1 + rf )kOt (z; j)]dF (z; j)
}
(5)
subject to the usual rationality and incentive-compatibility, if needed, conditions as follows:
For the case of the firm’s productivity z being successfully learned, labelled informed case
21In this economy, output is not equal to income mainly because we are not interpreting the aggregate
repayment for capital (i.e., output used for formation of capital that is fully depreciated) as aggregate
domestic investment.
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and denoted by the superscript ‘N ,’ the rationality condition is written as:
[z]1−α[kNt (z; j)]
α − dNt (z; j) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ [z, z] (6)
where the firm’s outside-option value is normalized to zero (Giannetti and Yu; 2014). For the
other case in which the financier has failed to learn z, labelled uninformed case and denoted
by the superscript ‘O,’ the rationality and incentive-compatibility conditions are written as:
[z]1−α[kOt (z; j)]
α − dOt (z; j) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ [z, z], (7)
[z]1−α[kOt (z; j)]
α − dOt (z; j) ≥ [z]1−α[kOt (z′; j)]α − dOt (z′; j), ∀z ∈ [z, z],∀z′ 6= z. (8)
and the non-negativity constraint kIt ≥ 0, the non-negative profit condition DIt −(1+rf )kIt ≥
0 for I ∈ {O,N}. Note that for this case in which the given firm’s productivity z is unknown
to the financier, the financier needs to provide such a firm with an incentive so that the
firm voluntarily reveals the firm’s productivity z, captured by the incentive-compatibility
constraint (8). That is, the firm in equilibrium reports its true productivity z despite the
available choice of lying and reporting z′ 6= z because the financier (principal) has designed
the loan contract menu so that truth reporting does maximise the payoff to the borrowing
firm (agent). Under the truth-telling mechanism, low-types will not mimic high types as debt
repayments increase in z. The function Φ(µt(j)) ≡ {(kNt (z; j), dNt (z; j)), (kOt (z; j), dOt (z; j))}
denotes the loan contracts optimal to the financier’s problem above for a given level of
information production µt(j).
The financier, in turn, chooses the optimal level of information production µt(j) so as to
maximise its own beginning-of-period expected profit, i.e., the present value of the interme-
19
diation profit V (µt(j); j)/(1 + rf ) net the current information-production costs:









c(µt(j); z, at)dF (z; j)
}
(9)
where W (at; j) refers to the financier’s beginning-of-period profit function from producing
information and providing group j of firms with loan services.
2.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium in this economy is a list of the policy and value functions of the loan
contracts that satisfy the condition that for each group/industry j ∈ {S, L}, both loan
contracts (kNt (z; j), d
N
t (z; j)), (k
O
t (z; j), d
O
t (z; j)) for z ∈ [z, z] and information production
µt(j) are optimal decision rules for solving the financier’s problem.
3 Results
This section presents analytic results of the model. First, the financier’s problem is anal-
ysed, and the equilibrium allocation of capital across firms is discussed. Second, the equi-
librium level of information production is characterised. Third, we discuss how growth in
the financier’s efficiency of information production affects relative firm growth between two
industries that differ in the technological composition of small firms. In doing so, we dis-
cuss sufficient conditions under which the model’s predictions are consistent with well-known
facts about financial development and firm growth (e.g., financial development leading to
increased information production disproportionately benefits the small firms/industries).
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3.1 Allocation of Capital for Given Information Production
This section analyses the industry-level equilibrium allocation of capital as a function of the
level of information production. We begin by characterising the solution to the financier’s
problem of designing (constrained) optimal loan contracts for a given group of firms. We
suppress the group/industry index j unless otherwise mentioned.
Lemma 1. Consider a firm of which realized ex-post productivity is z. The financier’s problem
of designing optimal loan contracts for such a firm (5) is equivalent to maximising the “virtual









α − (1 + rf )kht (z)
}
(10)
where the superscript ‘h’ indicates whether the financier has failed to learn z for h = O, in
which case the indicator function 1{h=O} equals one, or not for h = N , in which case the
indicator function 1{h=O} equals zero.
22 The solution to the problem above is characterized
as follows:




















2. The financier’s end-of-period profit is is written as:




















22It is obvious that the financier’s reformulated problem of designing optimal loan contracts (10) is identical
to the planner’s problem of the optimal allocation of capital subject to the same informational constraints.
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3. The participation constraint binds for the firm of the lowest productivity z = z.
kit is non-decreasing in z and the FOC of (10) yields the associated debt repayment. The
expected value of the firm is increasing in z, the debt payment is also increasing in z. Note
that the term (1 − α)[φ(z)/z] · [z]1−α[kh(z)]α in equation (10) quantifies the degree of the
capital-allocation distortion due to the asymmetric information problem, essentially caused
by the incentive compatibility constraint, compared to the first best case of no asymmetric
information. More specifically, it is the “informational rent” received by the borrowing
firm so that such a firm voluntarily reveals its private information on z. For every firm of
productivity z which the financier has failed to learn, such a degree of the capital-allocation
distortion should not be too large such that the amount of “informational rent” is smaller
than the borrowing firm’s output so that the financier receives a positive profit from providing
the firm with the intermediation service. Indeed, this is the case guaranteed by the second
part of the assumption (A1), so that the financier has an incentive to provide every firm
with the intermediation service. Otherwise, the financier would not provide such a firm with
the intermediation service, which is uninteresting and ruled out.23
As shown in Lemma 1, the solution to the financier’s problem of designing the optimal
loan contracts is independent of time t. From now on, the time index t is suppressed for the
solution to the financier’s problem, e.g., kh(z) stands for kht (z).
23The second part of the assumption (A1) that φ(z) is bounded above kicks in here: for a firm of produc-
tivity z ∈ [z, z], the degree of the capital-allocation distortion (1−α)[φ(z)/z] · [z]1−α[kh(z)]α is smaller than
the firm’s output [z]1−α[kh(z)]α essentially because (1 − α)[φ(z)/z] < 1. More specifically, consider a firm
of productivity z that the financier has failed to learn. For such a firm, the ratio of the degree of the distor-
tion (1 − α)[φ(z)/z] · [z]1−α[kh(z)]α to the firm’s output [z]1−α[kh(z)]α is simply given by (1 − α)[φ(z)/z].
Below we show that (1 − α)[φ(z)/z] < 1 for every z ∈ [z, z]. We start by rewriting the second part of the
assumption (A1) as: [1 − α]φ(z)/z < 1. Note that φ(z)/z ≤ φ(z)/z ≤ φ(z)/z where the last inequality
follows from the first part of the assumption (A1) that φ(z) is non-increasing in z. Thus, we have shown
that [1− α]φ(z)/z < 1,∀z ∈ [z, z].
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Discussion: Marginal Product of Capital We discuss how the (equilibrium) marginal
product of capital is different across firms, which has an important implication for the effi-
ciency of capital allocation. Let MPKh(z) ≡ dyh(z)/dkh(z) denote the marginal product of
capital of a firm with the productivity of z, depending on the indicator h denoting whether
the financier has learned such a productivity h = N or not h = O. Given production function
yh(z) = [z]1−α[kh(z)]α, MPKh(z) is in equilibrium written as:
MPKh(z) = α · [z]1−α[kh(z)]α−1, for h ∈ {N,O}. (13)
Using the results in Lemma 1 for the equilibrium allocation of capital kh(z), we can rewrite
the equilibrium marginal product of capital as follows:
MPKN(z) = 1 + rf , (14)






Lemma 2. Consider firms of which productivities the financier fails to learn: for such
firms, a firm’s marginal product of capital is strictly decreasing in the firm’s productivity:
dMPKO(z)/dz < 0. By contrast, for firms of which productivities the financier succeeds to
learn, the marginal product of capital is the same across firms: dMPKN(z)/dz = 0.
Results in Lemma 2 imply that capital allocation is efficient for firms of which pro-
ductivities the financier succeeds to learn, which is straightforward given that there is no
informational friction for these firms. By contrast, for firms of which productivities are un-
known to the financier, capital allocation is distorted in the classical sense: the small firm’s
MPK is higher than the large firm’s MPK, which is driven by the informational friction. Put
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differently, distortion in the capital allocation is mainly driven by the degree of informational
friction [1− µt(j)], the fraction of firms’ whose productivities are unknown to the financier.
This key informational friction can be mitigated by the financier’s information production
µt(j), which is, in equilibrium, determined by the financier who balances, as will be discussed
soon, its marginal benefit and cost.
3.2 Information Production
This section characterises the equilibrium level of information production. For group j of
firms, the first-order condition for equilibrium information production µt(j) is, if satisfied,







[HMC(z) + µt(j)]dF (z; j) = 0 (16)






















and HMC(z) ≡ c[z−γ]. (18)
Rearranging terms, we can simplify the first-order condition for µt(j) as:
µt(j) = atE[MR(z); j]−E[HMC(z); j] if 0 < atE[MR(z); j]−E[HMC(z); j] < 1 (19)
where E[MR(z); j] =
∫ z
z
MR(z)dF (z; j) refers to the average MR(z), labelled marginal




the average HMC(z), labelled marginal cost of information production for group j. These
two quantities, i.e., the industry-specific marginal revenue and cost of information produc-
tion E[MR(z); j] and E[HMC(z); j], will be used later in explaining the mechanism of the
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relative level of information production between the small and large industries µt(S)−µt(L).
From now on, the financier’s efficiency at is assumed to be of a moderate level such that
the first-order condition for equilibrium information production µt(j) is satisfied.
Assumption (A2) :
[
atE[MR(z); j]− E[HMC(z); j]
]
∈ (0, 1), ∀j ∈ {S, L}.
3.3 Relative Firm Growth between Two Industries
This section discusses the effect of a marginal improvement in the financier’s efficiency of
information production on industry-level firm growth where ‘industry’ refers to ‘group of
firms’ as mentioned earlier. In particular, we focus on relative firm growth between two
industries that differ in the technological composition of small firms. More specifically, we
assume that the technologically large industry j = L’s productivity distribution FL first-order
stochastically dominates (FOSD) the technologically small industry j = S’s distribution FS.
Assumption (A3): FL first-order stochastically dominates FS such that:
FL(z) < FS(z), ∀z ∈ [z, z]. (20)
The assumption (A3) says that for any given level of productivity z, the cumulative
probability FS(z) of the small industry is greater than that of the large industry. Note
that for a given threshold level of productivity z̃ for a firm to be small, the industry j’s
technological composition of small firms is equal to Fj(z̃) ≡ Prob[z(i, j) ≤ z̃] given the
aforementioned result that the within-industry capital allocation is non-decreasing in the
firm-level productivity z. Thus, the assumption (A3) implies that in the small industry, the
technological composition of small firms is greater than in the large industry.
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We present results for the two key equilibrium quantities: the industry-level marginal
revenue and cost of information production E[MR(z)|Fj] and E[HMC(z)|Fj], especially
relative magnitude of each of these two quantities between the two industries.
Lemma 3. Consider that assumptions (A1)-(A3) hold. In this case, the two results follow:
1. E[HMC(z)|FS] ≥ E[HMC(z)|FL].
2. If α[φ(z)/z − φ′(z)] > 1 and α < 0.5, then E[MR(z)|FS] ≥ E[MR(z)|FL].
The first part of results in Lemma 3 say that in the technologically small industry, the
industry-specific marginal cost of information production E[HMC(z)|Fj] is, by construc-
tion, also greater than in the technologically large industry. More interesting part is the
second part of results in Lemma 3, which provides sufficient conditions under which in the
technologically small industry j = S, the industry-specific marginal revenue of information
production E[MR(z)|Fj] is greater than in the technologically large industry j = L. Taken
together, the two results in Lemma 3 the relative industry-specific level of information pro-
duction between the two industries is in equilibrium determined by which one of these two
opposing forces dominates the other.
We discuss the economic mechanism about the marginal benefit of information production
E[MR(z)|Fj], especially its difference between the small and large industries. The marginal
revenue of information production for industry j’s firms E[MR(z)|Fj] ∝ E[πN(z)−πO(z)|Fj]
= E[yN(z) − yO(z)|Fj]/[1 − α] is essentially determined by the degree to which output is
distorted due to private information on productivity E[yN(z)−yO(z)|Fj]. If such a degree of
distortion is decreasing in the firm’s productivity z (i.e., the greater degree of distortion for
the smaller firm), then the marginal benefit of information production in terms of reducing
26
such a degree of output distortion is of magnitude disproportionately greater for the small
industry than for the large industry.
Consider the degree of output distortion curve [yN(z)−yO(z)] as a function of productivity
z. The slope of such a degree of output distortion curve is determined by the difference in
the slope between the non-distorted output curve yN(z) and distorted output curve yO(z),
where the slope of yN(z) is constant, and −α[φ(z)/z − φ′(z)] is one of determinants of the
slope of yO(z) relative to the slope of yN(z). Thus, the condition above α[φ(z)/z−φ′(z)] > 1
essentially says that the slope of the distorted output curve yO(z) is much steeper than the
slope between the non-distorted output curve yN(z) so that the slope of the degree of output
distortion curve [yN(z) − yO(z)] is negative, i.e., the degree of output distortion is greater
for the smaller firm than for the larger firm.
Another condition α < 0.5 in Lemma 3 is mainly about the curvature of the degree of
output distortion curve [yN(z) − yO(z)]. The non-distorted output curve yN(z) is flat (i.e.,
zero curvature, or constant slope), while the distorted output curve yO(z)] has a curvature
that is essentially determined by α/(1− α). As such, α < 0.5 makes sure that the degree of
output distortion curve [yN(z)− yO(z)] is strictly concave.










and α < 0.5.
The assumption (A4) implies, as discussed for the results in Lemma 3, the two key features
of the model that for the small industry, both marginal cost and revenue of the financier’s
24The condition that [φ(z)/z−φ′(z)] is bounded below holds for numerous examples of log-concave density
with reasonable parametrization. The condition of α < 0.5 seems also plausible. Note that the production
function specified in this paper can be thought of as the usual Cobb-Douglas function of the variable amount
of capital powered by α and fixed level of labour input (powered by 1−α); in this case, α would correspond
to the capital income share in national income account and is typically smaller than 0.5 in most countries.
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information production are of magnitude greater than for the large industry.
Industry-Specific Output Growth This section discusses how growth in the financier’s
efficiency of information production is propagated to firm growth in terms of output growth.
(Results for firm growth in terms of capital growth are presented in section A.2 in the Online
Appendix and quite similar to those in terms of output growth.) In particular, we discuss how
the output growth rates of the technologically small and large industries responds differently
to an increase in the financier’s efficiency growth. We begin by discussing the relative level
of output between these two industries conditional on whether the financier has learned the
borrower’s productivity z or not.
Corollary 1. Consider that four assumptions (A1)- (A4) hold. In this case, two results
follow: (1) E[yh(z)|FL] ≥ E[yh(z)|FS] for ∀h ∈ {N,O} , and (2) E[yN(z) − yO(z)|FS] ≥
E[yN(z)− yO(z)|FL].
The first part of results in Corollary 1 says that industry-level average output conditional
on whether the firm’s productivity z is learned by the financier h = N or not h = O is in
equilibrium higher in the large-sized industry than in the small-sized industry, which is not
surprising. Interestingly, the second part of result in Corollary 1 shows that in the (tech-
nologically) small industry, the industry-specific marginal benefit of information production
E[yN(z)−yO(z)|Fj] is of magnitude greater than in the large industry. That is, consider two
firms that (i) belong to the same industry and (ii) have the same productivity but (iii) are
different in terms of whether or not the financier has succeeded in learning the firm’s produc-
tivity. Then, the difference in expected output between these two firms E[yN(z)− yO(z)|Fj]
would have been zero if there were no informational friction, and hence represents the degree
of the capital-allocation distortion due to the informational friction. This distortion can be
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reduced by increasing the level of information production µt(j). Thus, E[y
N(z)− yO(z)|Fj]
measures the industry-specific marginal benefit of information production, which is greater
in the small industry than in the large industry, consistent with the consensus in the litera-
ture that the smaller industry/firm has the greater growth potential that would be realised
if financial obstacles are removed.
We turn to discussing how the industry-specific growth rate of output is in equilibrium
related with the financier’s efficiency growth. Let g(yt(j)) ≡ dlog(E[yt(z)|Fj])/dt denote
the (spontaneous) growth rate of industry j’s average output.25 Note that industry j’s
average output can be written as: E[yt(z)|Fj] = µt(j)E[yN(z)|Fj] + (1− µt(j))E[yO(z)|Fj],






µt(j)E[yN |Fj] + (1− µt(j))E[yO|Fj]
· g(µt(j)). (21)
As can be seen in equation (21), industry j’s average firm growth g(yt(j)) is driven
by growth in the financier’s information production specific to the corresponding industry
g(µt(j)). Given that it is of our main interest to study the relative response of firm growth
between the small and large industries to growth in the financier’s efficiency of information
production, we proceed to discussing how the financier’s information production responds
to an increase in the financier’s efficiency of information production, especially its difference
between the small and large industry.
We define the relative equilibrium growth rate of information production between two in-
dustries. Let g(µt(j)) ≡ dlog(µt(j))/dt denote the (spontaneous) growth rate of information
25We consider the change in a variable xt over a short time interval [t, t+ ∆] where ∆ > 0 is small. In this
case, the growth rate in xt+∆ would be approximated well by xt+∆/xt−1 ≈ ∆ · [dxt/dt]/xt = ∆ ·dlog(xt)/dt.
The short length of the time interval ∆ is constant and suppressed.
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, g(at) ≡ dlog(at)/dt (22)
where g(at) denotes (spontaneous) growth in the financier’s information-production efficiency
at. As shown by equation (22), industry j-specific information growth g(µt(j)) is in equi-
librium proportional to the financier’s efficiency growth g(at), which is common to every
industry, with the industry-specific sensitivity that is increasing in the equilibrium quantity
E[HMC(z)|Fj]/[atE[MR(z)|Fj]]. That is, if E[HMC(z)|Fj]/[atE[MR(z)|Fj]] is greater for
the small industry j = S than for the large industry j = L, then a given increase in g(at)
would increase information growth disproportionately for the small industry than for the
large industry. This is important for the relative output growth between these two indus-
tries, as output growth is driven by changes in the allocative efficiency, which are in turn














Simply put, assumption (A5) guarantees that in response to an increase in the financier’s
efficiency, information production for the small industry increases to magnitude greater than
26Here we consider the change in a variable xt over a short time interval [t, t + ∆] where ∆ > 0 is small.
In this case, the growth rate of xt+∆ is approximated as: xt+∆/xt − 1 ≈ ∆ · [dxt/dt]/xt = ∆ · dlog(xt)/dt.
The short length of the time interval ∆ is constant and can be suppressed in discussion of main results.
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that for the large industry.
Using results in (21)–(22), we can rewrite the response of industry j-specific output
growth to one unit increase in the financier’s efficiency growth ∂g(yt(j))/∂g(at) as:
∂g(yt(j))
∂g(at)

















This result says that the effect of the financier’s efficiency growth on industry j-specific
output growth is determined by the two components: (i) the level of the financier’s effi-
ciency at that is a common factor affecting the given country’s all industries, and (ii) the
industry-specific growth sensitivity the financier’s efficiency growth Ψt(j). We discuss the
implications of this result. Suppose that the financier’s efficiency growth increases by one
unit. Consider the disproportionate firm growth for the small industry [∂g(yt(S))/∂g(at)−
∂g(yt(L))/∂g(at)]. According to the results in (24), [∂g(yt(S))/∂g(at) − ∂g(yt(L))/∂g(at)]
is given by at[Ψt(S)−Ψt(L)], which is determined by the small industry’s disproportionate
growth sensitivity [Ψt(S)−Ψt(L)] and increasing in the level of the financier’s efficiency at.
One caveat is that these results, seemingly quite intuitive, can not be directly used for the
purpose of comparing [∂g(yt(S))/∂g(at)−∂g(yt(L))/∂g(at)] across different level of at as the
industry-specific growth sensitivity term Ψt(j) is also a function of at. That is, the variation
of [∂g(yt(S))/∂g(at) − ∂g(yt(L))/∂g(at)] over at has two components: (i) linear variation
mainly driven by the variation of at holding the industry-specific growth sensitivity term
Ψt(j) constant, and (ii) non-linear variation due to the effect of at on Ψt(j).
We turn to discussing the differential firm growth between the small and large industries.
31
More specifically, we define the relative effect of the (one-percentage) improvement of the
financial intermediary’s efficiency (REIFIE) on industry-level output growth between the











As discussed earlier, the effect of at on REIFIE(yt) has two components: linear and non-



































From this result, it immediately follows if the non-linear effect is of magnitude sufficiently
small relative to the linear effect at[Ψt(S) + Ψt(L)] < 1, that the total effect of at on
REIFIE(yt) is dominated and determined by its linear effect REIFIE(yt)/at. We dis-
cuss sufficient conditions under which such a linear effect is positive REIFIE(yt)/at > 0.
Proposition 1. If five assumptions (A1)- (A5) hold, then the “linear” variation in REIFIE(yt)
over a country’s financial development at is positive: REIFIE(yt)/at > 0.
Results of Proposition 1 say that in the more financially developed country (in which at
is higher), the disproportionate effect of the financier’s efficiency growth on the small indus-
try’s output growth is of magnitude greater than in the less financially developed country.
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Here, the key assumption is assumption (A5), which, as discussed earlier, guarantees that
in response an increase in the financier’s efficiency growth g(at), growth in information pro-
duction for the small industry is greater than that for the large industry. Note that in the
model, information growth is the key in generating output growth via the improved alloca-
tive efficiency, which is the reason why the assumption (A5) is a critical condition to derive
results of Proposition 1. Meanwhile, the assumption (A4) implies the key feature (rather
than results) of the model such that for the small industry, both cost and benefit of infor-
mation production are magnitude greater than for the large industry, whereas assumptions
(A1)- (A3) are technical ones related to the mechanism design theory (due to the existence
of private information).
The economic mechanism is as follows: Consider the effect of one unit parallel shift down
in the financier’s marginal cost curve on the industry-specific level of information production.
In this case, the induced marginal increase in information production equals, up to a first-
order approximation, the inverse of the cost-curve slope, and hence is of magnitude smaller
for the case of the steeper marginal cost curve. Thus, the relative effects of the financier’s
increased efficiency on information production and capital growth between the small and
large industries are essentially determined by how steeper the financier’s marginal cost curve
is for the small industry than for the large industry.
Note that in a financially underdeveloped country, the difference in the slope of the fi-
nancier’s marginal cost curve between the small and large industries is greater than in a
financially advanced country. For instance, in a financially advanced country, the difference
in the cost of information production between these two industries is negligible such that the
financier’s marginal cost curve is almost identical between the two industries. By contrast,
in a financially underdeveloped country, the financier’s marginal cost curve is substantially
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steeper for the small industry than for the large industry. Therefore, in a financially un-
derdeveloped country, the disproportionate effect of the financier’s improved efficiency on
the small industry’s output growth would be of magnitude smaller than in a financially ad-
vanced country. Importantly, this effect is driven by the tightly related differential growth
in information production between the two industries.27
Note that results of Proposition 1 are limited to the “linear” relationship between the
small industry’s disproportionate output growth REIFIE(yt) and a country’s financial de-
velopment at. The general relationship (i.e., including linear and nonlinear ones) would be
analysed by examining the derivative ofREIFIE(yt) with respect to at (i.e., ∂REIFIE(yt)/∂at)
rather than the slope of REIFIE(kt) to at as in Proposition 1.
28
Lemma 4. If five assumptions (A1)- (A5) hold and at[Ψ(S) + Ψ(L)] < 1, then the small
industry’s disproportionate output growth REIFIE(yt) is increasing in a country’s financial
development at: ∂REIFIE(yt)/∂at > 0.
Proof. Results immediately follow from the results in (28) and those of Proposition 1.
Results of Lemma 4 essentially say if the industry-specific growth sensitivity terms
Ψ(S) and Ψ(L) are of magnitude sufficiently small, that the linear relationship between
REIFIE(yt) and at determines the over effect of at on REIFIE(yt). The reason is that
the non-linear effect of at on REIFIE(yt) is mainly due to the effects of at on the industry-
specific growth sensitivity terms Ψ(S) and Ψ(L).29
27Indeed, the “linear” relationship between a country’s financial development at and the small industry’s
sensitivity of information growth to the financier’s efficiency growth (relative to that of the large industry)
REIFIE(µt) ≡ [∂g(µt(S))− g(µt(L))]/∂g(at) and at is also positive (i.e., REIFIE(µt)/at > 0) under the
assumption (A5), as discussed in section A.1 in the Online Appendix.
28Such a relationship is what is actually examined in our empirical analysis, as is in most of empirical
works. In this sense, under at[Ψ(S) + Ψ(L)] < 1, our analytic results about this linear relationship, though
limited, shed some lights on mapping the theory of the financial intermediary’s information production to
empirical facts.
29The non-linear effect of (28) arises because the term at−E[HMC(z)|Fj ]/E[MR(z)|Fj ] of (25) increases in
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4 Some Evidence
This section discusses empirical evidence supporting the model’s key mechanism. First, we
test the hypothesis that the cost of financial intermediation to screen out potential borrowers
is disproportionately larger for firms in the small industry. Importantly, we also test whether
or not such a cost spread between firms in the small industry and firms in the large industry
is decreasing in the level of a country’s financial development.
Mores specifically, we use syndicated loan data to measure the cost of financial interme-
diaries to certify borrowers’ creditworthiness. Syndicated loan data is widely used in the
literature that studies the empirical relationship between the cost of borrowing and infor-
mation asymmetry as bank loans are one of the most widely used means of finance. Using
this data, we provide evidence supporting one of the key features of the model: i.e., the cost
of information production specified earlier in equation (3) and the overall adverse relation-
ship between the cost spread of financial intermediaries and the country’s financial market
development.30
Second, we test the hypothesis about the relative firm growth between the small and
large industries (i.e., the results in Proposition 1). This hypothesis states that the effect
of improvement in the financial intermediary’s capability of information production on the
disproportionate growth in the small industry (relative to that in the large industry) is of
magnitude greater in the more financially developed country than in the less financially
both the country’s level of financial development and output distortion(E[yN (z)|Fj ]−E[yO(z)|Fj ]) while the
term [1/E[MR(z)|Fj ]]·[E[yO(z)|Fj ]/[E[yN (z)|Fj ]−E[yO(z)|Fj ]]] decreases in output distortion. The adverse
relationship with output distortion arises because the sensitivity of industry-specific percentage growth to
one percentage growth in the financier’s efficiency decreases in the level of financial development. By such
a non-linear relationship, when output distortion is reduced much faster than improvement in financial
development, the effect on growth weakens and may even turn negative. The condition at[Ψ(S) + Ψ(L)] < 1
ensures a balanced (opposite) change in output distortion and financial development.
30The features of the cost function of information production used in our model are also broadly consistent
with previous findings in the literature— Philippon and Reshef (2007) and Liberti and Mian (2010).
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developed country. We use industry-country data from United Nations Industrial Statistics
and World Bank. Together with the evidence on the syndicated loans, the evidence suggests
that the trade-off between the cost and benefit of financial intermediaries’ production of
information on the borrowing firm’s profitability (related to the firm’s creditworthiness),
especially the evolution of such a trade-off over a country’s level of financial development,
has an important implications for the disproportionate firm growth in the small industry
relative to that in the large industry.
4.1 Determinants of Costs of Financial Intermediation
Data Source We employ a sample of 8,366 syndicated loans, signed January 1, 1987
and December 31, 2014 which is drawn from the Reuter/Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC)’s
DealScan database. The sample uses a single loan tranche as a unit of observation. Since
many projects are financed with more than one loan tranches, multiple tranches appear
as separate observations in our sample. We collect detailed information about each loan
tranche: loan size, fees paid by the borrowers, maturity, signing date, and so on.
We use the borrower’s fees as proxies for the cost of financial intermediation, the bor-
rower’s fees include loan spread, commitment fee, letter of credit (LC) fee, annual fee, and
utilization fee. The fee information generally captures the costly process of lenders to cer-
tify the borrowers’ inside information and relieve information asymmetry. Table 1 presents
summary statistics of the variables of the syndicated loan.
As in Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine (2008), we are interested in whether in-
dustries that have a larger share of small firms for technical reasons grow faster in economies
with well-developed financial systems. We consider the industry’s technological composition
of small firms that is not constrained by the financial obstacles and measured as the corre-
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sponding U.S. industry’s small firm share in employment.31 The reason why we avoid using
the actual country-industry’s average firm size is that as discussed in Beck, Demirguc-kunt,
Laeven and Levine (2008), a given country’s financial obstacles could affect the country-
industry’s actual firm size, which would raise the endogeneity problem in identifying the the
small industry’s disproportionate firm growth.
[Insert Table 1.]
Methodology and Results Let ci,k,c,t denote the cost of borrowing in terms of loan spread
for the observation of tranche i, industry k, borrowing country c and year t. The regression





·Smallk+Ψ ·Xk ·FDc,t+Ω ·Zi,k,c,t+γk+γc+γt+εi,k,c,t (29)
where Smallk is the log of industry k’s technological composition of small firms; FDc refers to
country c’s private credit-to-GDP ratio that is widely used, in the literature studying finance
and economic development, as a proxy for the country’s level of financial development. FDc
corresponds to the model-side measure of the level of financial intermediaries’ efficiency at.
32
The parameter vector Ψ measures the effects of of the interaction terms between financial
development FDc,t and industry-level characteristics Xk (that is discussed in more detail
later), while industry-specific fixed effects are also controlled for by the term γk. Ω refers
to the coefficients on the loan-specific characteristics vector Zi,k,c,t that includes loan size,
31We use the share in employment of small firms (as of 1997) that have hired less than 20 employees in
1997, constructed by Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine (2008). There is previous literature which
takes the share in employment of small firms empirically as agents’ hidden types — Plehn-Dujowich (2009)
32To measure the easiness of the business firm’s access to external finance, we would use a country’s
enterprise credit-to-GDP ratio, if available, constructed by Beck et al. (2012). Unfortunately, panel data on
the enterprise credit-to-GDP ratio is not available during the sample period of syndicated loan data, where
closing dates of the syndicated loans are various over the years.
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maturity, the active dummy (set to one if the loan is active as of the time of observation
t), the refinancing dummy (set to one if the loan tranche is used to refinancing an existing
project), and the currency risk dummy (set to one if the loan denomination currency differs
from the currency of the local currency of the borrower’s country). We also control for the
country- and year-specific fixed effects via γc and γt dummies, respectively. And εi,k,c,t is the
error term.
Industry k’s characteristics, which are interacted to the country’s level of financial de-
velopment, are as follows: (i) dependence on intangible assets Intangibilityk (Claessens and
Laeven; 2003), (ii) the four-firm concentration ratio Concentrationk (Beck, Demirguc-kunt,
Laeven and Levine; 2008), and (iii) dependence on external finance Ext Depk (Rajan and
Zingales; 1998). The industry’s firm size is already controlled for by the industry’s small
firm share Small. (See appendix, section A, for their definitions.) Industry-specific char-
acteristics are specific to industry k (independent of sample countries c) and measured for
the corresponding U.S. industry, where U.S. is taken as the country with the highest level of
financial development and hence the least likely to be affected by financial obstacles (Beck,
Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine; 2008). In measuring these industry-specific characteris-
tics, we either use the readily available data provided by the cited authors above or construct
them by following the methodology in the cited papers.
The coefficient α1 on the industry’s small firm share Smallk (i.e., inverse measure of the
industry’s technological firm size) measures how larger the cost of financial intermediation
for the small industry is than that for the large industry, which is, by conventional wisdom
in the literature, expected positive. Importantly, the coefficient α2 on the interaction term
between Smallk and FDc,t is intended to capture the (marginal) effects of (within-country
and within-industry) differences in financial development on the disproportionate cost of
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financial intermediation ci,k,c,t for the small industry (relative to that for the large industry).
The null hypothesis is that α2 is zero. If α2 is negative, then it indicates that the cost spread
(of financial intermediation) between the small and large industries is decreasing in the level
of a country’s financial development: i.e., in the more financially developed country, the
disproportionate cost of financial intermediation for the small industry is smaller than in the
less financially developed country.
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the regression equation, where the dependent
variables are various proxies for the cost of financial intermediation, measured as borrowers’
fees, and include (i) commitment fee, (ii) letter of credit (LC) fee, (iii) annual fee, (iv)
utilization fee, and (v) loan spread. The estimated coefficient α1 is, as expected, positive
and significant at the five percent level for three measures: (i) commitment fee, (ii) letter of
credit (LC) fee, and (v) loan spread, while it is either insignificant for the case of (iii) annual
fee or significantly negative for the case of (iv) utilization fee. That is, the aforementione
three measures of the financial-intermediation cost are consistent with the consensus in the
literature that for the small industry, the cost of financial intermediation is larger than for
the large industry. Moreover, estimation results for the coefficient α2 on the interaction term
between Smallk and FDc,t show that α2 is, as expected, negative for most of cases except
for the case of (iv) utilization fee, for which α2 is positive but insignificant and importantly,
α1 is, differently from the consensus, negative. In particular, for the three cases for which
α1 is positive (i.e., (i) commitment fee, (ii) letter of credit (LC) fee, and (v) loan spread), α2
is negative for all of the three cases and significant at the one percent level in the two cases:
(ii) letter of credit (LC) fee, and (v) loan spread. Taken together, our regression results for
the cost of financial intermediation
For robustness check, we examine how the regression results for the standard control
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variables are affected by the existence of the control variables of our main interest. That is,
we drop the interaction terms Smallk × FDc,t and Xk × FDc,t from the list of the control
variables, and estimate again the regression equation of the cost of financial intermediation
(29). Estimation results in this case are presented in Table 3 and are consistent with the
baseline results in Table 2. For instance, the coefficient α1 on the industry’s small firm
share Smallk is still positive for all five measures of the cost of financial intermediation and
significant (at the five percent level) for three measures of the cost of financial intermediation.
[Insert Table 2.]
[Insert Table 3.]
These findings suggest some evidence the key features of the model that the cost of
financial intermediation—likely to be transferred to borrowers ultimately— is greater for
the small industry than for the large industry, and that such a disproportionate cost for the
small industry would be reduced as the country’s level of financial development (i.e., the
efficiency of financial intermediation) increases.
4.2 Determinants of Industry-level Growth
Data Source We proceed to test the hypothesis about the model’s main results (i.e., those
in Propostion 1) that in response to an increase in the financial intermediary’s efficiency
growth, disproportionate firm growth in the small industry (relative to that in the large
industry) is of magnitude greater in the more financially developed country. For this purpose,
we use the United Nations Industrial Statistics database (Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and
Levine; 2008), which is a industry-country panel and provides industry-level aggregated
information on performance of all firms by industry and country. (See section B in Online
Appendix for a list of sample industries and countries.)
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Our sample covers firms in the 20 NACE two-digit manufacturing industries and in 28
countries over the world, during the period 2004-2012 annually.33 Note that these countries
vary substantially in levels of economic and financial development. Throughout this section,
all monetary variables are in terms of the real 2013 U.S. dollars, and hence their growth
rates are also in real terms. Given the industry-level aggregated information, we delete
observations in the bottom- and top-tails as in Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine
(2008). As such, the sample includes 2,209 number of year-industry-country observations.
Methodology: Regression Framework and Construction of Variables We use the
system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) to avoid the problem of serial cor-
relation, heteroskedasticity and endogeneity of explanatory variables. One period is one
calendar year. Let gk,c,t ≡ log(yk,c,t+1) − log(yk,c,t) denote annual firm growth in industry k
and country c at time t+ 1 (i.e., the dependent variable is one period later than the control
variables), where yk,c,t is real value added (or real investment) per worker. The dynamic
panel regression equation of gk,c,t is written as:




· Smallk + Ψ ·Xk
)
· CBGc,t
+GDPc,t · Smallk + V alueAddedSharek,c,t + εi,k,c,t (30)
33The sample period is restricted because data on credit bureau index, which is used in measuring the
financial intermediary’s efficiency growth, is available since 2004. To overcome sample restriction, we use
the system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). It can improve
dramatically on the performance of the usual first-differenced GMM estimator when the autoregressive
parameter is moderately high and the number of time-series observations is moderately small.Blundell and
Bond (1998) tested the finite sample properties of the system GMM estimator even when the sample period
is 1979-1984. See online appendix for discussion of industries and countries included in the sample.
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where FDc refers to country c’s time-invariant level of financial development, measured as
the country’s enterprise credit-to-GDP ratio, on average during the sample period, that is
more specific to the degree of firms’ access to credit than the private credit-to-GDP ratio34
(Beck et al.; 2012); Smallk the log of industry k’s technological composition of small firms
as discussed earlier; and CBGc,t the growth rate of the efficiency of financial intermediaries’
information production in country c at time t, measured as annual growth in the credit
bureau index and explained later. And εi,k,c,t is the error term. To isolate the effect of the
financial intermediaries’ efficiency growth CBGc,t on the small industry’s firm growth, we
control for a number of industry- and country-specific characteristics, mainly those used in
Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine (2008), as follows: GDPc,t refers to per-capita real
GDP in country c at time t (controlling for economic development); V alueAddedSharek,c,t
the industry k’s value added share across industries in country c at time t (controlling for
the country-and-time specific industrial composition); Xk the vector of industry-specific
characteristics (measured for the corresponding U.S. industry).
Xk is a vector of industry characteristics (of which definitions are listed in appendix,
section A) and includes industry-specific components of (i) global growth opportunities
Growth Opportunityk (Fisman and Love; 2007), (ii) the degree of opaqueness in terms of
assessing firm performance in the stock market Opaquenessk Durnev et al. (2004), (iii) de-
pendence on intangible assets Intangibilityk (Claessens and Laeven; 2003), (iv) the four-firm
concentration ratio Concentrationk (Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and Levine; 2008) , and
(v) dependence on external finance Ext Depk (Rajan and Zingales; 1998). The three char-
acteristics (iii)–(v) are those that have been already used in the earlier analysis of the cost
of financial intermediation, while the first two characteristics (i)–(ii) (Growth Opportunityk
34By contrast, the private credit-to-GDP ratio includes credit given both to firms and to households.
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and Opaquenessk) are new ones and additionally controlled for as these two factors could
be potentially relevant to the industry-specific sensitivity to the financial sector’s improved
efficiency. The first one Growth Opportunityk is intended to capture the industry-specific
growth opportunities (e.g., global shift in demand that would increase firms’ growth in the
given industry), and the second one Opaquenessk captures the industry-specific sensitiv-
ity to improvement in the financial market’s capability to assess the firm performance. As
such, these two characteristics Growth Opportunityk and Opaquenessk could be related to
the industry-specific growth sensitivity to the financial intermediary’s efficiency growth, and
hence they are additionally controlled for our regression of industry-specific firm growth.
One of the key variables of interest is growth in the financial intermediaries’ efficiency.
Ideally, it should to be measured in terms of facilitating the provision of information on bor-
rowers’ profitability/creditworthiness, which is difficult. As for its proxy, we use the annual
growth rate of the country’s credit bureau index (aka credit bureau growth CBGc,t) during
the period 2004-2012, taken from the Doing Business publications of the World Bank. For a
given country and year, the credit bureau index measures the percentage of individuals and
companies of which past repayment history is provided, labeled coverage rate.35 Borrowers’
past repayment history is likely to provide valuable information on the likelihood of the com-
parable borrowers’ future repayment, and hence to be used as for the proxy of production
of information on borrowers’ creditworthiness about the future repayment (Djankov et al.;
2007; Arellano et al.; 2012). Under this plausible assumption, the credit bureau index is
taken as our measure of the financial intermediaries’ efficiency (i.e., inverse of the cost) of in-
formation production, and hence its average growth rate measures the per-year improvement
in the financial intermediaries’ efficiency of information production. The measure indicates
35Both private and public credit bureaus could exist; in such a case, we take the average of the two
credit-bureau coverage rates as the measure of credit bureau index for a given country-year observation.
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g(at) in the equation (20) and (26). We drop observations if the average growth rate of the
country’s credit bureau is extremely high, i.e., higher than 200 percent per year.
One caveat is that the credit bureau index measures the total number of individuals
and companies but not separately for each of these two different types of borrowers. Thus,
evidence presented in this paper is limited to the presumed case in which credit bureau
growth, even if the level of the credit bureau index is skewed for the individual borrowers
rather than corporate borrowers, would be positively correlated with growth in the financial
intermediary’s efficiency of production of information on corporate borrowers. This is likely
the case given that there could exist the economy of scope in the financial intermediary’s
production of information on different types of borrowers (e.g., a feedback effect from the
assessment of creditworthiness of individuals to that of companies, and vice versa).
Results Table 4 presents summary statistics of key variables of the U. N. Industrial Statis-
tics data together with country-level variables related to financial development. Descriptive
statistics (across industry-country observations) of industry-level variables such as real value
added per worker and real investment per worker are summarized in Panel A in Table 4. And
Panel B in Table 4 provides statistics of the country-level variables related with financial
development and growth in the financial intermediaries’ efficiency of information produc-
tion. (See section C in the online appendix for more detailed statistics for a given country
and industry, respectively.) As shown by Table 4, our sample exhibits substantial variations
both in investment growth and in value added growth. (See, in Panel A in Table 4, their
substantial standard deviations compared to their mean values.)
[Insert Table 4.]
It is of our interest to measure the disproportionate effect of credit bureau growth CBGc,t
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on the technically small industry’s growth, captured by the coefficient on the interaction term
Smallk ×CBGc,t. In particular, we are interested in testing whether or not such dispropor-
tionate firm growth in the small industry is greater, at least in the sense of the linear relation-
ship, in a country with a higher level of financial development: REIFIE(yt)/at > 0, which is
effectively captured by the coefficient on the triple interaction term Smallk×CBGc,t×FDc.
Here, the interaction term Smallk×CBGc,t is supposed to capture the disproportionate firm
growth in the small industry in response to the financial intermediary’s efficiency growth
(proxied by CBGc,t); as such, the triple interaction term Smallk × CBGc,t × FDc is in-
tended to measure the linear variation of Smallk × CBGc,t over a country’s financial de-
velopment FDc that is a proxy for the model’s measure of the financial intermediary’s effi-
ciency at. Taken together, the regression results are supposed to suggest evidence on whether
or not the disproportionate effect of credit bureau growth on the small industry’s growth
Smallk × CBGc,t is systematically related to the country’s level of financial development
FD.
[Insert Table 5.]
Table 5 present the results for the dynamic panel regression of industry-level firm growth,
estimated by the system GMM estimator. As shown by Table 5, that the coefficient, β2,
on the triple interaction term Smallk ×CBGc,t × FDc is positive and significantly different
from zero at the level of one percent and five percent in the regression of value added
growth and investment growth, respectively. These findings indicate that in a country with
a higher enterprise credit-to-GDP ratio, the technologically small industry’s value added and
investment growth is associated with growth in the provision of information on borrowers’
creditworthiness to the extent significantly greater than in a country with a lower enterprise
credit-to-GDP ratio. As such, these findings provide some evidence supporting the main
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results of the model.
Moreover, given that as shown by Table 1, the coefficient β1 on the interaction term
Smallk×CBGc,t is negative, our findings suggest that in financially underdeveloped countries
where FDc is low, the improved efficiency of financial intermediaries does not necessarily
increase capital growth in the small industry relative to that in the large industry. For
instance, if a country’s level of financial development is sufficiently low (e.g., Argentina), then
the estimated coefficient [β1 + β2FDc] would be even negative; in this case, an increase in
credit bureau growth increases disproportionately the large industry’s firm growth, opposite
to the case of financially advanced countries where [β1 + β2FDc] is positive.
5 Conclusion
This paper highlights the importance of understanding the mechanism of financial intermedi-
aries’ information production and its implications for the cross-section of capital allocation
and disproportionate firm growth in the small industry. In particular, we emphasize the
trade-off between the cost and benefit of financial intermediaries’ production of informa-
tion on borrowing firms’ profitabilities, especially the evolution of such a trade-off over a
country’s level of financial development. More specifically, we explore implications of the
hypothesis that the financial intermediary’s marginal cost curve of information production
is much steeper for the small firm than for the large firm, especially to magnitude greater in
the financially less developed country.
We build a growth model in which financial intermediaries’ production of information on
borrowers’ creditworthiness and loan contracts are endogenously determined. In particular,
we consider the case in which as in the data, the smaller firm’s productivity is more costly to
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assess, i.e., the financier’s marginal cost curve of information production is much steeper for
the smaller firm. Analytic results show that under some sufficient conditions, firm growth
in the technologically small industry relative to that in the technologically large industry is
more sensitive to growth in the financial intermediary’s efficiency of information production,
especially to the grater extent in the more financially developed country. These results imply
that in financially underdeveloped countries, the effect of the improved efficiency of financial
intermediaries on firm growth in the small industry could be of magnitude quite small.
Using data on syndicated loans and industry-level firm growth, we provide evidence sup-
porting the key mechanism. More specifically, using the data on various fees charged to the
loans made to firms, we provide some evidence supporting the key assumption that the cost
of financial intermediation for the small industry is higher than that for the large industry,
especially to magnitude greater in the financially underdeveloped countries. Moreover, by
using the data on the industry-level firm growth (measured both in value added growth and
in investment growth), we find evidence supporting the model’s main result: within-country
per-year growth in the credit bureau coverage is associated with significantly higher firm
growth in the technologically small industry than in the technologically large industry, espe-
cially to the magnitude significantly greater in the more financially developed country than
in the less financially developed country.
In this paper, we develop and integrate the theory of financial intermediaries’ information
production more tightly with extant empirical findings about financial development and firm
growth as well as with new facts documented in this paper. It would be interesting to examine
how differently the firm-level degree of financial constraint is relaxed in response to various
improvements in the external financing opportunities, e.g., improved efficiency in raising
capital via equity financing and other financial innovations. Such empirical findings could
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help researchers to reduce the gap between the theory of financial intermediary’s information
production and the rich empirical findings, which we leave for future work.
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A Definitions of Industry-Specific Characteristics
• Small firm share: the industry’s share in employment of small firms (as of 1997)
that have hired less than 20 employees in 1997, constructed by Beck, Demirguc-kunt,
Laeven and Levine (2008).
• Industry share in value added: the industry’s share in total value added of the
country’s manufacturing sector in year t.
• External finance dependence: technological dependence on external finance, mea-
sured as the corresponding U.S. industry’s counterpart (Rajan and Zingales; 1998).
• Intangibility: the industry’s dependence on intangible assets, from Claessens and
Laeven (2003); it is calculated as the ratio of intangible assets to fixed assets (using
the Compustat data) of U.S. firms in 2002.
• Growth opportunity: industry-specific component of global growth opportunities
(Fisman and Love; 2007)—measured as real annual growth in net sales in the corre-
sponding U.S. industry on average over the period 2002-2007.
• Opaqueness: the industry-level degree of opaqueness in assessing firm performance
in the stock market—measured as one minus firm-specific variability of stock returns
as in Durnev et al. (2004), based on Compustat and CRISP database. A high score
indicates more stock return synchronicity and thus less informative pricing.
• Concentration: industry-level four-firm concentration ratio—measured as the corre-
sponding U.S. industry’s counterpart in 2002 as in Beck, Demirguc-kunt, Laeven and
Levine (2008), based on the 2002 U.S. Census.
B Theoretical Appendix
The proof of Lemma 1 immediately follows from the results in Chapter 2 of Salanie (2005).
We present proofs of other results: Lemma 2, Lemma 3, Corollary 1, and Proposition 1.
• First, the proof of Lemma 2 is as follows:
Proof. dMPKN(z)/dz = 0 is obvious from the results in (14). Results in (15) show that
MPKO(z) is strictly increasing in φ(z)/z, which is strictly decreasing in z because φ(z) is
weakly decreasing in z (assumption A1), and 1/z is strictly decreasing in z.
• Second, the proof of Lemma 3 is as follows.
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Proof. The industry j-specific equilibrium marginal cost and revenue of information produc-



















. To prove the first part of the results




than or equal to
∫ z
z
λ(z)dFL(z). Given that FL “first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD)”






ϕ(z)dFL(z) for every function ϕ(z) that
is non-increasing in z. Thus, we proceed to showing that λ(z) is non-increasing in z. The






















Note that 1−(1−α)φ(z)/z is larger than zero under the assumption (A1) as discussed earlier
and smaller than one because φ(z)/z > 0 and α < 1. Thus, a sufficient, but not necessary,
condition for dλ(z)/dz < 0 is that the terms indicated by the underbrace denoted by ‘ξ’ is
larger than or equal to one, which is true under the two conditions: (i) α[φ(z)/z−φ′(z)] > 1
and (ii) α/[1 − α] − 1 < 0. In fact, the condition (i) above is obviously satisfied by the
first part of the assumption (A4), and moreover, the condition (ii) above is also satisfied by
the second part of the assumption (A4) as follows: The second part of the assumption (A4)
states that α < 0.5, from which it follows that 1/[1 − α] < 2 and hence that the condition


















The second result follows from the property that d{c[z]−γ}/dz = −γc[z]−γ−1 < 0. That







because FL “first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD)” FS.
• Third, the proof of Corollary 1 is as follows:





1−α · z is
proportional to z with a positive slope, i.e., yN(z) is strictly increasing in z, and FL “first-
order stochastically dominates (FOSD)” FS. We proceed to proving that E[y
O(z)|FL] ≥
E[yO(z)|FS], for which it suffices to show that yO(z) is non-decreasing in z. The first-order
52



























which is positive because 1 − (1 − α)φ(z)/z > 0 as shown earlier and φ′(z) ≤ 0 by the
assumption (A1). Last, we prove the remaining results that E[yN(z)−yO(z)|FS] ≥ E[yN(z)−
yO(z)|FL]. Because of E[yh(z)] = 11−α ·E[π
h(z)] for h ∈ {N,O}, it follows that for j ∈ {S, L},





which is strictly increasing in and proportional to E[MR(z)|Fj] = E[πN(z)|Fj]−E[πO(z)|Fj]
because (1−α) > 0. Note that E[MR(z)|FS] ≥ E[MR(z)|FL] by Lemma 3 and assumption
(A4), which proves that E[yN(z)|FS]− E[yO(z)|FS] ≥ E[yN(z)|FL]− E[yO(z)|FL].
• Fourth, the proof of Proposition 1 is as follows.
Proof. Assume that five assumptions (1)-(5) hold. We want to show that Ψt(S) > Ψt(L)
where Ψt(j) is defined as in equation (25). That is, Ψt(j) = 1
/
[ψ̃t(j) + ψt(j)] where
ψ̃t(j) ≡ at −
E[HMC(z)|Fj]
E[MR(z)|Fj]












Given that Ψt(j) is strictly decreasing both in ψ̃t(j) and in ψt(j), it suffices to show that
ψ̃t(S) < ψ̃t(L) and ψt(S) < ψt(L), where it was shown earlier that ψ̃t(S) > 0 and ψt(S) > 0.





E[MR(z)|FL]. Second, ψt(S) < ψt(L) is proven as follows: Note that













































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Determinants of Costs of Financial Intermediation
Note: this table presents results for the cross-sectional regression of the firm-level cost of financial inter-
mediation Ln(1 + ci,k,c,t)—in terms of commitment fee, LC fee, annual fee, utilization fee and loan spread
–at period t, in industry k and in country c over the sample period 1987-2015. ‘FD’ refers to the private
credit-to-GDP ratio (proxy for the level of financial development of a given country), ‘Growth Opportunity’
refers to the industry-specific component of global growth opportunities, ‘Ext Dep’ the industry’s techno-
logical dependence on external finance, ‘Intangibility’ the industry’s dependence on intangible assets, and
‘Concentration’ the industry’s four-firm concentration ratio. Standard errors are inside the parenthesis and
robust to cross-sectional clustering for a borrowing country. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ indicates significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable Commitment Letter of Annual Utilization Loan
Fee Credit (LC) Fee Fee Spread
Fee
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Small 0.0015*** 0.0139*** -0.0002 -0.0059** 0.031**
(0.0003) (0.0032) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.013)
Small × FD -0.0013* -0.0138*** -0.0014* 0.0002 -0.055***
(0.0006) (0.0031) (0.0008) (0.0002) ( 0.0006)
Intangibility × FD -0.0006 -0.0138*** -0.0021 0.0016** 0.0002
(0.0009) (0.0047) (0.013) (0.0004) (0.0013)
Concentration × FD 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003*** -8.52e-06
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Ext Dep × FD -0.0028* -0.0269*** -0.0018 0.0023*** -0.0080***
(0.0014) (0.0065) (0.0025) (0.011) (0.0028)
Ln(Loan amount) -0.0003*** -0.0032*** -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0037***
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Ln(Maturity) 0.0003*** 0.0023** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0012***
(0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.00000) (0.0004)
Active 0.0004**** -0.0018 -0.0002 - 0.0003
(0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0003) - (0.0007)
Refinancing 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0033*** -0.0020***
(0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Currency risk 0.0002*** -5.69e-06 -0.0002* 0.0001** -0.0017***
(0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Constant -0.0001 0.0302*** 0.0110 0.0240** 0.0596***
(0.0022) (0.0098) (0.0103) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 628 788 420 100 8,366
Number of countries 11 4 5 5 47
R2 0.25 0.42 0.28 0.29 0.26
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Table 3: Determinants of Costs of Financial Intermediation: Robustness Check
Note: this table presents results for the cross-sectional regression of the firm-level cost of financial interme-
diation Ln(1 + ci,k,c,t)—in terms of commitment fee, LC fee, annual fee, utilization fee and loan spread –at
period t, in industry k and in country c over the sample period 1987-2015. Standard errors are inside the
parenthesis and robust to cross-sectional clustering for a borrowing country. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ indicates
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable Commitment Letter of Annual Utilization Loan
Fee Credit (LC) Fee Fee Spread
Fee
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Small 0.0008*** 0.0028* 0.0002 0.0018*** 0.0024***
(0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0008)
Ln(Loan amount) -0.0003*** -0.0032*** -0.0001*** -0.0003** -0.0036***
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Ln(Maturity) 0.0003*** 0.0023** 0.0003*** 0.0007 0.0012***
(0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004)
Active 0.0005*** -0.0017 -0.0003 - 0.0003
(0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0003) - (0.0007)
Refinancing 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0035*** -0.0020***
(0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Currency risk 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002* 0.0002 -0.0018***
(0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant 0.0074*** 0.0642*** 0.0032** 0.0023 0.1035***
(0.0005) (0.0075) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0038)
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 628 788 420 100 8,366
Number of countries 11 4 5 5 47





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Determinants of Industrial Growth
Note: this table presents results for the dynamic panel regression of industry-level growth gk,c,t, defined as
log(yk,c,t+1)− log(yk,c,t)—in terms of real investment per worker and real value added per worker—at period
t, in industry k and in country c over the sample period 2004-2012. ‘CBG’ refers to growth in credit bureau
(proxy for growth in the financial intermediary’s capability of information production), ‘FD’ the enterprise
credit-to-GDP ratio (proxy for the level of financial development), ‘GDP per capita’ the yearly per-capita
real GDP, ‘Growth Opportunity’ the industry-specific component of global growth opportunities, ‘Ext Dep’
the industry’s dependence on external finance, ‘Intangibility’ the industry’s dependence on intangible assets,
‘Opaqueness’ the industry’s degree of opaqueness in terms of assessing firm performance in the stock market,
and ‘Concentration’ the industry’s four-firm concentration ratio. Standard errors are inside parenthesis. ‘*’,
‘**’, and ‘***’ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable (gk,c,t) Investment Growth Value-Added Growth
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Small 0.331 0.333 4.001*** 4.028***
(1.433) (1.435) (1.398) (1.387)
Small × CBG -0.061** -0.103** -0.106*** -0.068
(0.029) (0.049) (0.027) (0.046)
Small × CBG × FD 0.123** 0.123** 0.191*** 0.201***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050)
Small × GDP per capita -0.083 -0.086 -0.525*** -0.518***
(0.158) (0.158) (0.154) (0.153)
Industry Share in Value Added -0.115* -0.118* -0.240*** -0.232***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.060) (0.060)
Growth Opportunity × CBG -0.250 -0.930
(1.225) (1.148)
Opaqueness × CBG 0.304 -0.564
(0.377) (0.353)
Intangibility × CBG 0.024 0.011
(0.070) (0.065)
Concentration × CBG 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Ext Dep × CBG -0.006 -0.020
(0.032) (0.030)
Investment per Worker -0.021 -0.019
(0.070) (0.070)
Wage 0.081 0.085 0.190*** 0.179***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066)
yt−1 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,209 2,209 2,209 2,209
Number of countries 28 28 28 28
Wald χ2 559.52 559.35 368.80 375.19
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